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enacting CPLR 214-a. 63 Moreover, as Dean McLaughlin has sug-
gested, it would be somewhat ironic if the discovery rule was applied
liberally in negligence actions yet strictly applied in those actions
which were the source of the rule-medical malpractice actions. 6 ,
Despite these obstacles, it is submitted that the Reis court's exten-
sion "of the Flanagan rule make[s] eminently good sense;"2 5 it
seems manifestly unjust to bar a plaintiff from asserting a cause of
action before he even knows of its existence.
Equitable conversion of surplus mortgage foreclosure proceeds.
It is a settled principle of New York law that there cannot be a
tenancy by the entirety in personal property. '66 When there is a
voluntary sale of real property held as a tenancy by the entirety, the
proceeds are considered personalty and the tenancy by the entirety
is terminated, creating either a joint tenancy or a tenancy in com-
2I Proewig v. Zaino, 176 N.Y.L.J. 80, Oct. 25, 1976, at 16, cols. 2, 3 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County).
2' McLaughlin, Trends, Developments: New York Trial Practice, 176 N.Y.L.J. 92, Nov.
12, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
265 CPLR 214, commentary at 55 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
20 Originally, the New York rule prohibiting tenancies by the entirety in personal prop-
erty was established by case law. See, e.g., Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192
N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1963); In re Estate of Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911
(1923); In re Albrecht, 136 N.Y. 91, 32 N.E. 632 (1892). The principle since has received
statutory codification. EPTL § 6-2.1(a)(4); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-311(1) (McKinney
1969).
Only a husband and wife can hold property as tenants by the entirety. See Vlcek v. Vlcek,
42 App. Div. 2d 308, 310, 346 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (3d Dep't 1973) (there can be no tenancy by
the entirety in real property held by parties never married); Ackerman v. Ackerman, 78 Misc.
2d 1, 2, 342 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973), aff'd mem., 45 App. Div.
2d 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d 535 (2d Dep't 1974) (tenancy by the entirety may exist only between a
husband and wife validly married at time of transfer of property). EPTL § 6-2.2 is the
operative statute in determining the type of tenancy created by a disposition. The only
instance in which a tenancy by the entirety may exist appears in subdivision (b) which
provides: "A disposition of real property to a husband and wife creates in them a tenancy by
the entirety, unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common." EPTL
§ 6-2.2(b).
As tenants by the entirety, no one spouse may unilaterally partition the real property,
nor dispose of any interest in such property which will adversely affect the other spouse's right
of survivorship. Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 312, 39 N.E. 337, 338 (1895). Tenancy by the
entirety is based on the common law concept of the unity of husband and wife. Id.; Ackerman
v. Ackerman, 78 Misc. 2d 1, 1, 342 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973);
9A P. ROHAN, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACEc 6-2.2[81[a] (1970). The right of survivorship can
be destroyed only by the dissolution of the marriage or the voluntary act ;f both husband
and wife. In re Estate of Dickie, 55 Misc. 2d 976, 978, 286 N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (Sur. Ct. Erie
County 1968). For a general discussion of tenancies by the entirety, with emphasis on the
spouse's right to alienate his or her own interest, see Klorfein, Tenancies by the Entirety in
New York, 9 N.Y.L.F. 460 (1963).
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mon.267 In contrast, where the conversion of real property is deemed
involuntary, as in a condemnation proceeding, courts of equity have
determined that the resulting funds retain the characteristics of
realty and the tenancy by the entirety continues.26 The distinction
between voluntary and involuntary conversions is not always clear,
however, and classifying the proceeds is often a difficult task. As a
result, substantial controversy has developed as to whether the sur-
plus proceeds of a mortgage foreclosure sale of property owned by
tenants in the entirety are to be treated as realty or personalty. " '
Recently, in Mojeski v. Siegmann,2so the Supreme Court, Suffolk
County, held that surplus monies from a mortgage foreclosure sale
are personalty, and, as such, cannot be held as a tenancy by the
entirety. 1
Mojeski was an action to confirm a referee's report in a surplus
money proceeding following a mortgage foreclosure and sale of the
realty. The referee determined that the surplus funds were personal
property and therefore severable, 2 enabling the husband's creditors
to be immediately compensated from the husband's share of the
funds.2s The wife contested this determination, asserting that the
2 See, e.g., In re Estate of Blumenthal, 236 N.Y. 448, 141 N.E. 911 (1923) (without more,
a bond and mortgage obtained on the sale of a tenancy by the entirety is held in common);
Secrist v. Secrist, 284 App. Div. 331, 132 N.Y.S.2d 412 (4th Dep't 1954), afl'd, 308 N.Y. 750,
125 N.E.2d 107 (1955) (cash proceeds of sale held as a tenancy in common with each spouse
entitled to one-half). The dissolution of a marriage by divorce also converts a tenancy by the
entirety into a tenancy in common. See, e.g., Steiz v. Shreck, 128 N.Y. 263, 28 N.E. 510
(1891); Martos v. Martos, 206 Misc. 860, 134 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1954). It should
be noted that if the parties expressly so stipulate, the estate will be converted into a joint
tenancy, rather than a tenancy in common. EPTL § 6-2.2(a).
2" See, e.g., City of New York v. Gorman, 252 App. Div. 103, 297 N.Y.S. 415 (2d Dep't
1942); In re Idlewild Airport, 85 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1948).
21 Several courts have adopted the principle of "equitable conversion" to find a tenancy
by the entirety in mortgage foreclosure surplus funds, while other decisions have character-
ized the ownership of the surplus funds as tenancies in common. See notes 275-76 and
accompanying text infra.
270 87 Misc. 2d 690, 386 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976).
"I Id. at 694, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
272 Id. at 691-92, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
27 The effect of the referee's decision was to treat the foreclosure sale as a voluntary
disposition. Absent a contrary expression, husband and wife are deemed to hold the proceeds
of a voluntary sale as tenants in common. See note 267 and accompanying text supra. It has
occasionally been argued that because one spouse contributed all or a greater portion of the
purchase price, that spouse's interest in the proceeds should be proportionately greater. The
courts have generally rejected this argument, however, instead presuming that a gift was
intended on the part of the spouse furnishing the consideration. Thus, each spouse is deemed
entitled to an equal share of the proceeds. See Secrist v. Secrist, 284 App. Div. 331, 132
N.Y.S.2d 412 (4th Dep't 1954), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 750, 125 N.E.2d 107 (1955); Martos v. Martos,
206 Misc. 860, 134 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1954).
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funds were held by her and her husband as tenants in the entirety.
Should the court find an estate by the entirety, no payments could
be made from the foreclosure proceeds until the wife's death estab-
lished her husband's right to dispose of the funds without her con-
sent.2
74
Noting that the issue presented has not received uniform treat-
ment in New York, the Mojeski court first reviewed the conflicting
authorities. Whereas one line of cases holds that surplus funds from
a foreclosure sale are constructively real property and therefore ac-
corded tenancy by the entirety status,275 the other line of authority
holds that a mortgage foreclosure of realty is to be treated the same
as a voluntary conversion of real property.278 Under the latter ap-
proach, the resulting proceeds are personal property held as a ten-
ancy in common. 277 Basing its decision primarily on a recent Court
of Appeals case, Hawthorne v. Hawthorne, 2 1 the Mojeski court
aligned itself with the cases holding that surplus proceeds are per-
sonalty.275
In Hawthorne, it was necessary for the Court to determine
whether the proceeds of a fire insurance policy covering real prop-
erty held as a tenancy by the entirety should be "impressed in
equity with the inseverable quality of the ownership of the realty
against whose loss they are payable. 2 0 Declaring that the right to
the proceeds stemmed from a "voluntary contractual act,"' 1 the
27' 87 Misc. 2d at 691, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 610. The wife did not object to paying their joint
creditors from the surplus fund. Id.
21 The line of decisions construing the surplus funds to be real property held as a tenancy
by the entirety began with the case of Germania Say. Bank v. Jung, 18 N.Y.S. 709 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1892). The Mojeski court disapprovingly noted, however, that the authority
cited in Germania for this proposition was only dictum. 87 Misc. 2d at 692, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
610. The Germania approach has been followed in several cases, including First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Lewis, 14 App. Div. 2d 150, 218 N.Y.S.2d 857 (2d Dep't 1961); Security Trust
Co. v. Miller, 72 Misc. 2d 269, 338 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (Wayne County Ct. 1972); Stretz v.
Zolkoski, 118 Misc. 806, 195 N.Y.S. 46 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1922).
276 E.g., Sasario v. Calo, 63 Misc.2d 534, 313 N.Y.S.2d 250 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1970); College Point Sav. Bank v. Tomlinson, 42 Misc. 2d 1061, 249 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1964); Franklin Square Nat'l Bank v. Schiller, 202 Misc. 576, 119 N.Y.S.2d
291 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1950).
See note 273 supra.
28 13 N.Y.2d 82, 192 N.E.2d 20, 242 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1963).
279 87 Misc. 2d at 693-94, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12.
280 13 N.Y.2d at 83, 192 N.E.2d at 20, 242 NY.S.2d at 52.
2' Id. at 85, 192 N.E.2d at 22, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 52. The Court's rationale in Hawthorne
provides some guidelines for distinguishing voluntary and involuntary conversions. The Court
said:
[Miere involuntary loss . . . does not suffice to support the analogy sug-
gested. . . . In the condemnation cases the forced conversion from realty to person-
[Vol. 51:632
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Hawthorne Court concluded that the property had not been invol-
untarily converted, and thus the funds could not be deemed
realty. 1s2 Noting that an estate by the entirety could not exist with
respect to personalty,2 3 and stressing the belief that to hold other-
wise would result in "a decision that ties up money"2 4 and impedes
the enjoyment thereof, the Court held that the proceeds should be
divided.25 Furthermore, in dictum, the Hawthorne Court cited with
approval the earlier decision of Franklin Square National Bank v.
Schiller,25 wherein it was expressly held that surplus mortgage fore-
closure funds are personalty subject to a tenancy in common. Em-
bracing the rationale of Hawthorne, the Mojeski court ruled that the
mortgage foreclosure proceeds in the instant case were indeed per-
sonalty subject to severance.2 17
The decision reached by the Mojeski court is a sound one. A
finding that a tenancy by the entirety exists might well dictate that
the proceeds be placed with the court, a result which would prevent
either spouse from reaching the funds until the death of the other.28
Additionally, just as the Hawthorne Court found that the proceeds
did not spring from the loss of the realty, but rather from the con-
tract for insurance, and as such were not the result of an involuntary
conversion, it can also be argued that the loss in a mortgage foreclo-
sure is the natural consequence of a voluntary mortgage agreement.
Finally, the cases which have treated surplus funds as real property
held by the entirety trace their inception to an era when the right
of a wife to control, use, and possess her own property had only
recently been recognized. At that time it would have been a drastic
alty as fully involuntary. The involuntary loss was also the legal source of the new
res. Here, while the loss was the occasion of the issuance of the now disputed draft,
neither the draft nor the right thereto springs from the involuntary loss. It is not a
substituted res as in the condemnation cases. It is not involuntary conversion.
Id. at 85, 192 N.E.2d at 21-22, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 52 (emphasis in original).
In Id. at 86, 192 N.E.2d at 22, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
2 Id. at 85-86, 192 N.E.2d at 22, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
2 u Id. at 86, 192 N.E.2d at 22, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 53. See note 288 infra.
13 N.Y.2d at 86, 192 N.E.2d at 22-23, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
" Id. at 86, 192 N.E.2d at 22, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 53, citing Franklin Square Nat'l Bank v.
Schiller, 202 Misc. 576, 119 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1950).
87 Misc. 2d at 693-94, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12.
In those mortgage foreclosure actions wherein the courts treated the surplus proceeds
as real property held by the entirety, the monies generally were paid into the court or the
county treasurer's office until the death of one of the spouses. See, e.g., South Shore Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Gundel, 42 Misc. 2d 510, 248 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1963); Lois v. Shaughnessy, 26 Misc. 2d 536, 209 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1960); Empire State Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wukowitz, 197 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester County 1959).
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step for a court to have granted a wife one-half of a fund which
constituted the remains of property in which her only prior interest
was thought to be a right of survivorship.55
It is submitted that the importance of having free access to the
surplus proceeds coupled with the possible injustice to creditors
mandates concurrence with the rule of Franklin Square as recently
reaffirmed in Mojeski. Meanwhile, the lack of controlling authority
may lead to further contradictory results in this already confused
area of the law. Hopefully, therefore, the Court of Appeals will
conclusively resolve the issue at the earliest opportunity.
21 The early restrictions placed on a wife's right to control, use, or possess property held
as tenants by the entirety are amply illustrated by Germania Say. Bank v. Jung, 18 N.Y.S.
709, 710 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1892), wherein the court ordered that the surplus proceeds
held as a tenancy by the entirety be placed in trust with the income and profits paid to the
husband during the couple's lives. Id. at 711. It was 3 years later that the Court of Appeals
recognized a wife's right to share equally in the control, use, and possession of a tenancy by
the entirety. See Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 315 (1895).
